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Abstract
Philosophers often make exotic-sounding modal claims, such as: “A timeless world is 
impossible”, “The laws of physics could have been different from what they are”, “There 
could have been an additional phenomenal colour”. Otherwise popular empiricist 
modal epistemologies in the contemporary literature cannot account for whatever 
epistemic justification we might have for making such modal claims. Those who do 
not, as a result of this, endorse scepticism with respect to their epistemic status typi-
cally suggest that they can be justified but have yet to develop some distinct, workable 
theory of how. That is, they endorse a form of non-uniformism about the epistemology 
of modality, according to which claims about philosophically interesting modal mat-
ters need to be justified differently from e.g. everyday or scientific modal claims, but 
they fail to provide any more detail. This article aims to fill this gap by outlining how 
such a non-uniformist view could be spelled out and what story about philosophically 
interesting modal justification it could contain.
Keywords
metaphilosophy – modal epistemology – modality – non-uniformism – pluralism – 
epistemic value 
1 Introduction
The philosophy of modality concerns possibility, necessity, and related notions 
such as counterfactuals, dispositions, or essences. The epistemology of modality 
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concerns the human cognitive situation with respect to modality – typically 
alethic (as opposed to e.g. epistemic) modality. Alethic modal matters range 
from the mundane and everyday, like “It is possible for this table to break” and 
“David Lewis could have been a prosecutor rather than a philosopher”, to the 
exotic that tend to interest philosophers, such as “It is possible for there to be 
a philosophical zombie”, “The laws of nature could have been different from 
what they are”, “A timeless world is impossible”, “There could be such a thing as 
a utility monster”, “Personal fission is not possible”. The latter bunch are exam-
ples of modal matters apparently very distant or different from what we know 
to actually be the case. I will refer to claims about such matters as philosophi-
cally interesting modal claims. 
In contemporary modal epistemology, many philosophers hold that we 
make a lot of justified modal claims, and also that we have good accounts of 
how they are justified. But when it comes to philosophically interesting modal 
claims, things are different, and these good accounts do not apply. In response 
to this, some modal epistemologists embrace partial modal scepticism1 and 
claim that we cannot make justified philosophically interesting modal claims. 
Others, however, suggest that we have yet to develop some distinct, workable 
theory of their justification. That is, they are committed to some form of non-
uniformism about the epistemology of modality. Non-uniformism is the view 
that there is more than one basic route to modal justification, i.e. it is a form 
of pluralism about modal justification. Self-proclaimed non-uniformists often 
hold that different forms of justification are tied to different kinds of modal 
claims. In this case, the view would be that claims about philosophically inter-
esting modal matters need to be justified differently from e.g. everyday modal 
claims. While several authors have gestured in this direction, no details have 
so far been provided. This article is concerned with how such a non-uniformist 
view could be spelled out and what story about philosophically interesting 
modal justification it could contain. 
The non-uniformist view I outline has two main characteristics. First, it 
appeals to a more general pluralism, namely epistemic value pluralism. Second, 
it subsumes the epistemology of philosophically interesting modality under 
a more general view of the epistemology of philosophy, by making one’s jus-
tification for such modal claims a function of one’s justification for philo-
sophical accounts of relevant phenomena. In doing so, I will be adapting an 
1 I focus on justification (broadly construed) rather than knowledge. So, with ‘scepticism’ 
I intend the view that we do not, and (given our current cognitive machinery) are unlikely to 
ever, make justified claims. Scepticism with respect to subject matter s is thus the view that 
we do not, and are unlikely to ever, make any justified claims about s.
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existing account of modal justification – Fischer’s (2017) theory-based modal 
epistemology – and fitting it into a value pluralist framework. The suggested 
view will only be one of many possible views, of course, and I anticipate it 
will not be to everyone’s immediate liking. Others are free to offer their own 
preferred story, resting on other assumptions than mine, but I hope to make a 
convincing case that the present alternative is worthy of serious consideration.
The plan for the article is as follows. Section 2 describes the background 
against which philosophically interesting modal claims seem problematic. 
Section 3 briefly explains why questions of epistemic value are relevant to ques-
tions of justification. Section 4 outlines how pluralism about epistemic value 
can underwrite a form of non-uniformism about modal epistemology. Section 
5 develops the axiologically motivated non-uniformism I have in mind and the 
epistemology of philosophy (and thereby, philosophically interesting modal 
claims) that goes with it. Section 6 makes some clarifications in response to 
anticipated objections, and section 7 concludes.
2 What Is the Problem with Philosophically Interesting  
Modal Claims?
At issue in this article are philosophically interesting modal claims. This term is 
not ideal, yet I think it captures what I have in mind better than alternatives. 
Let me say a few words about how I use it. Vaidya (2015) talks of “extraordinary” 
(as opposed to “ordinary”) modal judgements as “typically (…) about some spe-
cial philosophical concept”. This is clearly in the right direction, but might be 
too narrow. For instance, ‘law of nature’ is certainly of philosophical interest, 
but is it a “special philosophical concept”? Moreover, philosophically interest-
ing modal claims are not always directly “about” some such concept, but might 
state e.g. an exotic possibility that conflicts with some theory or other of a 
philosophically interesting concept or phenomenon. This highlights that phil-
osophically interesting modal claims can be interesting either in themselves or 
in virtue of what they imply. Others (van Inwagen 1998, Roca-Royes 2017) talk 
of “remote” modal facts, as the contrast class of the “everyday” facts that are 
uncontroversially knowable in the sense that it would be strongly revisionary 
to deny that we often have knowledge of them. What I call “philosophically 
interesting” modal matters share this “remoteness” feature: they are not uncon-
troversially knowable. This means that some modal matters, presumably of 
interest to philosophers, are not going to count as philosophically interesting 
in my sense here, because they are not remote. For instance, it is both of inter-
est to many epistemologists and uncontroversially knowable that it is possible 
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for there to be a life-size papier-mâché mock-up of a barn. However, many 
remote – i.e. not uncontroversially knowable – modal matters will be sub-
ject to scientific rather than philosophical investigation, and they are not my 
focus here.
The class of philosophically interesting modal claims, as I use the term, is 
thus a subclass of claims about remote modal matters, namely those that typi-
cally and primarily occur in contexts of philosophical research and discussion. 
Finally, I recognise that the modal claims at issue are clearly more common in 
some philosophical fields (such as metaphysics broadly construed, including, 
e.g., parts of metaethics and philosophy of mind) than in others, but I don’t 
think it is possible to say exactly where they do and do not occur. It is hard to 
say much more of what, exactly, unifies the modal matters that fall in this sup-
posedly problematic class. For the sake of this article, I assume these remarks, 
together with the examples in the introduction, give enough of an idea.
Why do philosophically interesting modal claims present a special problem 
in contemporary modal epistemology? Traditional modal epistemologies – 
e.g. conceivability theories (Yablo 1993, Chalmers 2002), modal intuitionism 
(Bealer 2002), and certain essence-based modal epistemologies (Lowe 2012, 
Hale 2013) – were rationalist in nature. They took modal justification to have 
an a priori source. They also tended to target all modal claims in more or less 
the same way. But under the widespread assumption (among modal episte-
mologists, at least) of modal realism (i.e. that modal truths are about mind-
independent facts), modal rationalists appear to have a hard time explaining 
how these a priori methods can be reliable means of finding out about modal 
facts. To cut a long story2 very short, this has turned modal epistemologists 
of recent years to non-rationalist alternatives. But these new, non-rationalist 
modal epistemologies do not seem applicable to philosophically interesting 
modal claims. In a nutshell, the problem is that certain methods (e.g. intuition, 
conceivability) appear to be unreliable with respect to modal truth, and other 
methods (e.g. induction, perception, various scientific methods) that are oth-
erwise thought to be reliable guides to truth nevertheless appear to be unreli-
able with respect to philosophically interesting modal truths.
For instance, according to empiricist modal epistemologies (Bueno and 
Shalkowski 2014, Strohminger 2015, Leon 2017, Roca-Royes 2017), modal jus-
tification has its source in experience and/or experiential knowledge plus 
2 For criticism of rationalist modal epistemologies, see e.g. Roca-Royes 2010 and 2011, Vaidya 
and Wallner 2018, Jenkins 2008 (chapter 2.5), Mizrahi and Morrow 2015, Horvath 2014, Leech 
2011, Worley 2003. For an argument that puts pressure on the idea that empiricist alternatives 
do obviously better than rationalism on some matters, see Sjölin Wirling 2021.
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certain extrapolation from that knowledge. They are attractive because they 
make modal justification a matter of epistemic resources – e.g. perception, 
induction – we generally regard as reliably delivering true beliefs. But it is 
highly controversial to assume that this reliability extends to philosophically 
interesting modal matters. 
For another example, according to Williamson (2007), one is justified in 
claiming that p is possible if one does not arrive at a contradiction when coun-
terfactually developing the supposition that p in imagination. This account is 
attractive because it makes justification of possibility claims a product of a 
cognitive capacity that we likely possess, namely the ability to reliably evalu-
ate counterfactuals, and there is an evolutionary story to tell of why we should 
have acquired such a capacity. But first, there are doubts about whether that 
story covers also reliability with respect to philosophically interesting modal 
matters; and second, the search for contradiction must be sufficiently thor-
ough in order to deliver justification of a possibility claim, and as Strohminger 
and Yli-Vakkuri (2018) note, the more different p is from the actuality that we 
have experience of, the more difficult it likely is for us to competently develop 
the supposition that p in imagination: we will presumably be more likely to fail 
to detect relevant contradictions. This arguably goes for our counterfactually 
developing philosophically interesting ps. 
3 Interlude: Some Observations about Epistemic Value
To say that a belief is epistemically justified – whatever one means by that – is 
to say that the belief is in positive epistemic standing, that it is good, or valu-
able, from an epistemic point of view. Many other states and properties are 
also epistemically valuable: knowledge, true belief, rationality, understand-
ing, curiosity, etc. But arguably some of these things have merely derivative 
epistemic value, i.e. their epistemic value can be fully explained in terms of 
their relation to something distinct that is of fundamental epistemic value. 
Something has fundamental epistemic value just in case its epistemic value 
cannot be fully explained in terms of the epistemic value of distinct thing(s) 
(Sosa 2007, Sylvan 2018). 
One might hold that justification – on some understanding or other – has 
fundamental epistemic value, but a more common view is that justification has 
derivative epistemic value. That is, justification is valuable because it promotes 
something of fundamental epistemic value. Many epistemologists are monists 
with respect to fundamental epistemic value: they think there is just one fun-
damental epistemic good. The hands-down most popular monist position is 
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veritism, i.e. the view that believing truly (and avoiding false belief) is the only 
fundamental epistemic good (Goldman 1986, David 2013, Pritchard 2014, Engel 
2017, Sylvan 2018). Veritists have to account for everything that is epistemically 
valuable, including justification (however it is understood), in terms of its rela-
tion to the fundamental good of believing truly. Note that this is in principle 
compatible with allowing, with e.g. Alston (1993), that all the properties in terms 
of which philosophers have attempted to spell out ‘justification’ – e.g. coher-
ence, reliability, intellectual virtue, evidence, rationality – are epistemic good-
making properties.3 All that is required is that their value can be accounted for 
in terms of their promoting the epistemic good of believing truly. For a verit-
ist then, a method, practice, or property can bestow justification on a state 
just in case the method, practice, or property in question tends to promote 
the fundamental epistemic good of believing truly. 
The question of epistemic value has not been much discussed in modal 
epistemology, but it is reasonable to assume that veritism is the default view 
there too.4 The way in which the debate is conducted reflects that modal epis-
temologists tend to assume that a method, practice, or property can justify a 
modal belief just in case it tends to promote the acquisition of true beliefs 
about modal matters. As we saw in the previous section, the perceived prob-
lem with philosophically interesting modal claims is that suggested routes to 
modal knowledge are apparently not reliable with respect to the philosophi-
cally interesting modal matters. That is, being a reliable means to true modal 
belief is seen as a necessary condition on any method which is to provide 
modal justification. Why? Presumably because, as veritists would have it, the 
epistemic value of justification is taken to lie in its being a way to promote 
acquisition of the fundamental epistemic good, i.e. true belief.
While popular, veritism is not the only available view of epistemic value. 
Another option is epistemic value pluralism, according to which there is more 
than one fundamental epistemic good, beside that of believing truly.5 A plural-
ist has more resources than a veritist when it comes to explaining instances 
3 For arguments to the effect that Alston and several other self-proclaimed pluralists are verit-
istic monists on the level of fundamental epistemic value, see Pedersen 2017 and Peels 2010.
4 The only explicit discussion of epistemic value in modal epistemology that I am aware of is 
due to Lam (2017). Lam also identifies veritism as the default background assumption behind 
much criticism of imagination-based modal epistemology, and then, interestingly, goes on to 
question the veritist assumption, just as I will. This thread has not, to the best of my knowl-
edge, been taken up elsewhere.
5 One may be a pluralist and hold that believing truly is not on the list of fundamental epis-
temic goods. I will ignore that option here. 
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of derivative epistemic value: a state or method x may be epistemically valu-
able in virtue of its relation to either of the fundamental epistemic goods.6 This 
opens up for a pluralism about particular epistemic good-making properties 
too. Justification may be realized in different ways, so that a state may be epis-
temically justified in virtue of promoting either of a plurality of fundamental 
epistemic goods. Alternatively, one might talk about two (or more) different 
kinds of justification, each understood as the promotion of one out of several 
epistemic goods.7 In what follows, I will appeal to a form of epistemic value 
pluralism to make headway with respect to the problem of philosophically 
interesting modal claims. In particular, I will exploit the way in which epis-
temic value pluralism opens up for pluralism with respect to modal justifica-
tion too. 
4 Non-uniformism about the Epistemology of Modality
Some philosophers endorse scepticism about the modal matters, including the 
philosophically interesting ones, that lie beyond the reach of the otherwise 
reliable methods (van Inwagen 1998, Leon 2017, Machery 2017). Others retreat 
to the claim that philosophically interesting modal claims can (perhaps) be jus-
tified through a distinct method, but it remains to be spelled out how (Bueno 
and Shalkowski 2014, 679; Strohminger 2015, 369; Roca-Royes 2017). The latter, 
agnostic alternative hints towards non-uniformism, i.e. pluralism with respect 
to modal justification. 
Typically, the idea is that different types of modal claims require different 
kinds of justification. How might such a view be motivated? As I have argued 
elsewhere (Sjölin Wirling 2020), the key to defending a non-uniformist view 
about the epistemology of modality is to explain why we should expect differ-
ent modal epistemologies for the relevant subclasses of modal beliefs. What 
explanation is suitable will depend on what heterogeneity, i.e. what subclasses, 
among modal beliefs one is appealing to. For instance, someone wishing to 
defend non-uniformism with respect to modal beliefs about abstract and 
6 Note that this disjunction is not exclusive: if there are, say, two final epistemic goods v and w, 
a given state or practice can be epistemically valuable both in virtue of contributing to v and 
in virtue of contributing to w, even if contributing to only one of v and w would be sufficient 
for being epistemically valuable.
7 Pluralism about justification does not follow from epistemic value pluralism; one may hold 
that justification is promotion of one particular fundamental epistemic good (e.g. believing 
truly), even if there are several.
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concrete entities respectively (e.g. Roca-Royes 2017, 2018) can claim first, that 
there are modal claims about both abstract and concrete entities (i.e. a cer-
tain heterogeneity), and second, that we have general reasons (independent 
of particular claims in modal epistemology) to think that we gain knowledge 
of abstract and concrete entities in different ways. Hence, we should expect 
that justified modal claims about entities of the respective kinds need to be 
accounted for by different theories. The background assumption here is that 
the nature of the objects of knowledge matter to how we can come by the 
relevant knowledge. Call that a metaphysically motivated non-uniformism. It 
is compatible with veritism – indeed fuelled by it, in a sense: the idea is that 
different methods are reliable with respect to truths about different kinds 
of things. 
Of course, the abstract/concrete distinction won’t give us non-uniformism 
with respect to everyday versus philosophically interesting modal matters 
since there are both everyday and philosophically interesting claims about the 
same entities, whether abstract or concrete (e.g. “Table t can possibly break” 
and “Table t could possibly have been made from a different chunk of wood”). 
One could, in principle, motivate it metaphysically if some other epistemi-
cally relevant metaphysical difference between such claims could be found. 
But a non-uniformist could also appeal to some other, non-metaphysical het-
erogeneity among modal claims. The important thing, as far as the argument 
for non-uniformism is concerned, is that the heterogeneity one is pointing 
to is plausibly relevant to the question of what the correct account of modal 
justification is. It should be clear from the previous section that facts about 
fundamental epistemic value are relevant to what accounts of justification – 
including modal justification – are licensed. A monist can only allow that a 
method or practice is justificatory if it is appropriately related to the funda-
mental epistemic good of believing truly. A pluralist, on the other hand, can 
as already noted allow that a method or practice is justificatory also in vir-
tue of promoting some other fundamental epistemic good, independently of 
whether and how it relates to believing truly. 
If one accepts a plurality about fundamental epistemic goods, it is plausible 
that a plurality of fundamental epistemic goods might be relevant to the epis-
temic evaluation of modal claims too. One way in which types of modal claims 
could be relevantly different is thus with respect to the fundamental epistemic 
good in relation to which they are to be epistemically evaluated. In particu-
lar, modal claims could be heterogeneous in the sense that different epistemic 
goods might be relevant to the epistemic evaluation of different types of modal 
claims. If so, we should expect different modal epistemologies for these differ-
ent types of modal claims. Call this axiologically motivated non-uniformism.
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4.1 Axiologically Motivated Non-uniformism
Epistemic value pluralism can be cashed out in many different ways, and the 
issue is seriously underexplored in the literature.8 Here I will just state the form 
I have in mind as underwriting an axiological non-uniformism according to 
which philosophically interesting modal claims are justified in a different way 
from e.g. claims about everyday modal matters, because philosophically inter-
esting modal claims are to be epistemically evaluated in relation to a different 
fundamental epistemic good than everyday modal claims.
First, as indicated towards the end of section 3, I understand epistemic value 
pluralism as disjunctive in the sense that I take each fundamental epistemic 
good as capable of conferring epistemic value independently. That is, if x and y 
are both fundamental epistemic goods, it is enough for some z to relate appro-
priately to either x or y in order for z to be derivatively epistemically valuable.9 
Second, I will assume that believing truly is a fundamental epistemic good, 
and pluralism is a matter of postulating one or more additional fundamental 
epistemic goods. In particular, I will assume – with most others in the modal 
epistemology debate – that many modal claims outside of the philosophically 
interesting class are typically to be epistemically evaluated in relation to the 
fundamental good of believing truly. I will argue that philosophically interest-
ing modal claims are not to be epistemically evaluated in relation to that fun-
damental epistemic good(s), but to a distinct one. 
This raises the question of how it is decided which epistemic good a particu-
lar claim, belief, method, or practice is to be evaluated in relation to. On the 
view I am currently outlining, that depends on the context in which it is made, 
as different fundamental epistemic goods are salient in different contexts of 
inquiry. This is one way of cashing out the fact that different epistemic contexts 
are governed by different norms, or infused with different epistemic obliga-
tions. As e.g. Jennifer Nado (2017, 2019) has convincingly argued, professional 
contexts of inquiry – e.g. science, philosophy, journalism – are governed by dif-
ferent epistemic norms than contexts of everyday inquiry. Scientists are under 
the obligation to perform a lot of epistemic actions – double-blind studies, 
checking for biases, etc. – that ordinary epistemic agents are not. Philosophy is 
also permeated with more demanding epistemic norms than ordinary inquiry, 
although they are typically less clearly articulated. One attractive way of 
explaining why different epistemic norms govern different contexts of inquiry 
is to say, as Nado does, that the epistemic activities in the different contexts are 
8 Exceptions include Pedersen (2017, 2020) and Axtell and Olson (2009).
9 One can also imagine a pluralism according to which a state or practice must contribute to 
all, or at least more than one, of the fundamental epistemic goods, in order to have epistemic 
value. I ignore that option in what follows.
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aimed at realising different epistemic states. This need not imply that differ-
ent fundamental epistemic goods are relevant to evaluating these practices – 
but depending on what the states are, their epistemic value may well be best 
explained in terms of distinct epistemic goods.
Given a plurality of epistemic goods and a plurality of contexts of inquiry, 
one might wonder what decides which good is salient in a given context. This 
is a hugely complex question, but my general view is that what epistemic good 
primarily governs a certain context of inquiry is partly up to us, in the sense of 
being determined by our interests, and how epistemic value(s) connect with 
other kinds of value. I’ll come back to this briefly in section 6.
Now, the basic claim of the axiologically motivated non-uniformism I am 
presenting is that different kinds of modal claims need to be justified in dif-
ferent ways because they generally occur in contexts of inquiry governed by 
distinct fundamental epistemic goods. In particular, while many modal claims 
occur in contexts primarily governed by the aim of attaining true beliefs, con-
texts of inquiry where philosophically interesting modal claims are typically 
made – contexts of philosophical inquiry, that is – are governed by the aim 
of attaining some other fundamental epistemic good(s). Since what promotes 
another good might well be different from what promotes true belief, the door 
is open for non-uniformism. 
The way I have characterised philosophically interesting modal matters – 
the subclass of remote modal matters that typically and primarily are of inter-
est in contexts of philosophical research and discussion – makes it eminently 
plausible that epistemic states or attitudes pertaining to them mainly occur 
and are epistemically evaluated in contexts of philosophical inquiry. However, 
they can sometimes occur in other contexts. A couple of friends can debate the 
metaphysical possibility of personal fission over beers in the pub, or a pensive 
teenager can form the belief that the laws of nature could possibly have been 
different. Assuming that believing truly is the salient epistemic good in those 
contexts, axiological non-uniformism implies that one may be justified in 
claiming e.g. that personal fission is possible in one context but not in another, 
on basis of the same method or reasons. Differently put, a modal claim may be 
epistemically justified in one sense but not in another.10 Here, I am only con-
cerned with the epistemic status of philosophically interesting modal claims 
as they occur in contexts of philosophical inquiry, and with the sense of justi-
fication relevant in such contexts.
10  Of course, a modal claim can also be justified in more than one sense, for instance if the 
method supporting it promotes more than one fundamental epistemic good.
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5 The Nature and Value of P-justification
What then, is the sense of justification relevant to philosophically interesting 
modal claims when they occur, as they normally do, in the context of philo-
sophical inquiry? Basically, my view is that Bob Fischer (2017) is right when 
he suggests that claims about the modal propositions that our amplified expe-
riential knowledge does not directly bear on need to be justified via our the-
ories that bear on the relevant phenomena. That is, I will adopt the general 
framework of his theory-based epistemology of modality (tem). According to 
tem, one is justified in making a philosophically interesting modal claim “It 
is possible that p” just in case one justifiably accepts a philosophical theory T 
according to which it is possible that p, and one’s claim “It is possible that p” is 
based on T. For tem to deliver justification for modal claims, three things need 
to be in place. First, it needs to be the case that theories have modal content, or 
at least have modal implications; second, we must have an account of theory 
justification; and finally, we must make sense of what it is to believe or claim 
something on the basis of a theory that one accepts. 
Like Fischer, I take most of the interesting action here to lie with the second 
condition. tem is designed to take care of remote modal claims, and it plausibly 
delivers justification of many scientifically interesting modal claims, because it 
is widely held that many scientific theories are supported by reliable scientific 
methods, and hence that we are justified in accepting them. However, Fischer 
suggests that tem delivers modal scepticism about philosophically interesting 
modal claims because it is implausible that the same goes for theories that 
would imply the truth of philosophically interesting modal propositions. 
Unsurprisingly, I do not share Fischer’s pessimism about the justificatory 
status of philosophical theories. Or rather, I do not share the tacit veritist 
assumption that underwrites the pessimism, i.e. that all epistemic justification 
requires truth-conduciveness. Instead, I suggest that there is a distinct type 
of justification relevant to the epistemic merit of philosophical theories, the 
epistemic value of which should not be understood in terms of the epistemic 
goodness of believing truly. Call this p-justification. I previously suggested that 
philosophically interesting modal claims also are justified in a distinct sense. 
What they require is p-justification, simply because they depend for their jus-
tification on the justification of philosophical theories that imply them, and 
those theories require p-justification. This is the sense in which my proposal, 
as flagged in the introduction, subsumes the epistemology of philosophically 
interesting modal claims under a more general epistemology of philosophy. The 
key claim is thus that the relevant sense of epistemic support in philosophical 
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inquiry more generally is p-justification, which is to be understood as the pro-
motion of a fundamental epistemic good distinct from that of believing truly. 
What, then, is p-justification? I think it is clear that the epistemic prac-
tices in which philosophers engage do provide support for the views that they 
put forward: many philosophical theories are supported, and some are bet-
ter supported than others. It is exactly this support that I intend to capture 
with ‘p-justification’. P-justification is provided by, more or less, philosophical 
business-as-usual. Philosophers go to great epistemic lengths when engaging 
in philosophical inquiry. There are a number of norms and standards regulat-
ing this inquiry, that they are expected, indeed epistemically obliged, to con-
form to. The epistemic actions that philosophers are required to and often do 
perform in the course of defending their views, prescribed by these norms and 
standards, do provide p-justification for these views and the claims that con-
stitute them. Of course, p-justification is a matter of degree, and certainly not 
all philosophical inquiry is in line with these epistemic norms. But presumably 
we all think that the more it is in line with them, the better it is qua philosophi-
cal inquiry. 
It is my view that p-justification is epistemically valuable. In the follow-
ing two subsections, I will first argue that this epistemic value should not be 
understood as promotion of true beliefs, and then propose two different ways 
in which an epistemic value pluralist might account for the epistemic value of 
p-justification: in terms of non-factive understanding or procedural objectivity. 
5.1 The Case against Truth-conduciveness
I will present three considerations that jointly present a good case for explor-
ing the idea that believing truly is not the salient fundamental epistemic good 
in contexts of philosophical inquiry, in relation to which the practices, rea-
sons, and methods that support philosophical theories are to be epistemi-
cally evaluated.
First, I said above that philosophical methodology provides p-justification 
for accounts of philosophically interesting matters, and so several philosophi-
cal accounts enjoy a type of justification – sometimes to a high degree. But it 
is also quite clear that with respect to most philosophical questions, there will 
not be a uniquely best p-justified account. Instead, we can often expect there 
to be at least two (but typically more) mutually exclusive accounts of the same 
phenomenon that both (or all) enjoy an equally high degree of p-justification, 
and philosophers will continue to disagree over which one of them is the cor-
rect account. This fact of systematic peer disagreement (Goldberg 2013) on 
substantive philosophical questions should be familiar to everyone working 
in the discipline. Apart from the fact that philosophers’ epistemic entitlement 
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to regard their own views as true might be undercut by the presence of sys-
tematic peer disagreement, it arguably also gives us a reason to doubt that the 
methods philosophers use to provide p-justification are reliable guides to true 
belief (in domains where such disagreement is observed).
In addition to this threat from disagreement against the reliability-
assumption, it also seems we lack good reasons in favour of that assumption. 
For instance, it has been argued that philosophers are not justified in taking 
explanatory virtues like simplicity, parsimony, and explanatory power, to be 
truth-conducive. Even if there are reasons to think that some virtues are truth-
conducive in specific scientific contexts, we cannot assume without indepen-
dent argument that this extends to philosophy, which is very different (Ladyman 
2012, Novick 2017, Saatsi 2017). Similar critique has been directed at the use of 
intuitions in philosophy: while intuition may well be reliably truth-conducive 
in ordinary contexts of inquiry, there is little reason to think that it will remain 
reliable in the non-standard cases that philosophers like to consider (Machery 
2017). Indeed, the criticism against intuition- and conceivability-based modal 
epistemologies referenced in section 2 is of a piece with this line of attack. 
In response to these concerns about truth-conduciveness of philosophical 
methodology, Helen Beebee (2018) suggests that we reconceive of philosophy’s 
aim. She agrees with a number of authors (e.g. Goldberg 2009, Brennan 2010, 
Fumerton 2010, Kornblith 2013) who have concluded from the above misgiv-
ings that we have no reason to think that philosophical methods do or ever will 
afford knowledge of true answers to the questions that philosophers inquire 
into, such as the nature of properties, knowledge, moral responsibility, and 
so on. This conclusion is clearly bad news insofar as the aim of philosophical 
inquiry is to establish knowledge and/or justified belief about the true answer 
to various philosophical questions but, Beebee suggests, it is not. I agree. 
Concerns about reliability are worrying to a friend of veritistic justification 
in philosophy, but for a pluralist there is hope to vindicate p-justification as 
perfectly respectable when viewed as promoting some distinct fundamental 
epistemic good.
Second, the epistemic standards that govern philosophical inquiry are in 
many senses more demanding than those governing other contexts of inquiry 
(Daly 2017, 35–38; Nado 2017). It is not easy to say exactly what those are, but 
at a minimum a philosopher advancing a view is arguably under the obligation 
to very carefully define all central concepts and terms, she must display famil-
iarity with the relevant literature, clearly outline the differences between hers 
and neighbouring views, present reasons that support her view that others will 
indeed recognise as such reasons, give proper consideration to counterargu-
ments and alternative solutions, and so on. Moreover, philosophers are also 
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expected to very carefully scrutinise other philosophers’ arguments, attempt to 
present counterexamples, draw out implications and underlying assumptions 
and scrutinise – perhaps question – them in turn, and so on. This is all part 
and parcel of providing p-justification. But we are under no such obligations in 
either everyday inquiry or – for some of these philosophy-obligations at least – 
in many scientific disciplines. 
As Nado argues, if we want to say that ordinary folk have the knowledge 
we normally think they have, then fulfilling the epistemic standards of profes-
sional fields of inquiry, including philosophy, is not necessary for knowledge. 
This indicates that inquiry governed by these supererogatory epistemic norms 
aims at an epistemic state distinct from that to which everyday inquiry aspires, 
i.e. “knowledge (and other ‘usual suspects’ like true belief)” (2019, 133). I agree. 
If this is right, methods of p-justification should presumably be evaluated with 
respect to how well they promote that distinct aim. Although Nado is silent on 
what state(s) philosophy is aimed at, some of her discussion indicates states 
that include/imply knowledge but also go beyond it, such as knowing that one 
knows. However, the fact that philosophical inquiry is governed by epistemic 
norms that are more demanding than the norms that govern everyday inquiry 
is also compatible with the idea that philosophy aims at something other than 
knowledge – something which might well be very demanding, although it does 
not imply or contain knowledge or true belief. Actually, this latter option is 
quite attractive if we combine the observations about demandingness with 
the reliability-considerations that drive Beebee to suggest a reconception of 
philosophy’s aim. On the one hand, philosophical inquiry is governed by epis-
temic norms that are demanding – and arguably much actual philosophical 
inquiry is in line with them. On the other hand, we have reason to doubt that 
actual philosophical inquiry – despite being in line with demanding norms – 
is sufficiently truth-indicative to count as justificatory in the sense relevant 
to knowledge.
The third point I want to raise concerns the nature of the systematic peer 
disagreements in philosophy. In paradigmatic disputes over facts, the function 
of arguing – of giving reasons that are supposed to weigh with the other party, 
or the audience – is to settle which side has the true description of the fact in 
question. We can expect many paradigmatic factual disputes to be settled at 
some point, as the world tends to “push back” against false beliefs. Of course, 
some factual disputes are irresolvable. For instance, distinguished archae-
ologists Sharon and Shapur might disagree over whether Neanderthals bur-
ied their dead, but there is no archaeological evidence available that would 
settle the debate and no reason to think that such evidence is forthcoming. 
However, Sharon and Shapur – and plausibly parties in most paradigmatic 
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factual disputes – have no problem agreeing on what kind of finding would in 
principle settle the issue and that they would adjust their beliefs in response to 
such a finding.
Philosophical disputes are similar to paradigmatic factual disputes in the 
sense that philosophers offer reasons that are supposed to weigh with others 
as reasons supporting their views. But we have little or no reason to expect 
that philosophical disagreements can be settled. First, there are typically no 
empirically accessible facts in light of which false philosophical claims can be 
corrected. Second, I doubt that philosophers in general can agree on what even 
in principle would constitute a conclusive reason to settle the issues they are 
debating. David Lewis (1983, x) remarks that
[t]he reader in search of knock-down arguments in favor of my theories 
will go away disappointed. Whether or not it would be nice to knock dis-
agreeing philosophers down by sheer force of argument, it cannot be 
done. Philosophical theories are never refuted conclusively.
I think this is right, and even more clearly, philosophical theories are never 
conclusively shown to be true. I do not think the explanation of why it is right 
is that the reasons and arguments philosophers present are bad, or too weak. 
Rather I think it is because settling conclusively which side of a dispute has 
the truth is not the function of reason-giving in philosophy; “reason-giving in 
philosophy” is meant here as a central part of the complex set of practices that 
has the potential to generate p-justification.
In fact, I think philosophical disputes have a lot in common with how Elgin 
(2017) describes a dispute in aesthetics over how Cezanne’s Le Compotier is 
best interpreted. As in philosophy, reason-giving and argument is central: not 
just any interpretation is viable; the disputants offer considerations that bear 
on the work in question, and are supposed to weigh with others, in support of 
their respective preferred interpretation. But we rightly don’t expect a dispute 
like this to be resolvable – the notion of a conclusive reason to settle on one 
interpretation over all others does not make sense. Yet, that is not a problem. 
Irresolvable disagreement is not an obstacle to successful epistemic activity in 
cases like this. This suggests, according to Elgin, that the point of reason-giving 
simply is not to convince one’s opponent or audience that one view is true 
and the other false – it must have another function. I would add that if it has 
another function, then it should be epistemically evaluated primarily in rela-
tion to that function. This function of reason-giving, as not meant to establish 
knowledge of a truth, is not limited to disputes over non-factual matters (as we 
may well think that there is no fact of the matter as to e.g. what interpretation 
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of Le Compotier is the correct one). As Elgin notes, the function that reason-
giving plays in aesthetics can also be relevant to factual disputes – especially 
where we have little or no reason to expect that the issue will be resolved, and 
this includes philosophical matters. 
5.2 Two Alternatives: Understanding and Procedural Objectivity
I have argued that we should not think of p-justification as the promotion of 
true belief (or any state which necessarily includes it). But what epistemic 
good does p-justification plausibly promote? I will presently outline two prom-
ising alternatives available to the axiological non-uniformist.
One option is to postulate that besides believing truly, there is another type of 
epistemic state that it is fundamentally epistemically valuable to be in, and this 
state is non-factive in the sense that it does not entail true belief. A promising 
candidate state here is non-factive understanding. The relevant type of under-
standing is not concerned with individual propositions but objectual (Kvanvig 
2003), i.e. it is understanding of a subject matter (e.g. causation, moral respon-
sibility, the Comanche dominance of the southern plains of North America 
between the 17th and 19th century). Roughly, one has understanding insofar as 
one grasps a comprehensive set of interrelated propositions about this subject 
matter and how they relate to each other. Kvanvig thinks that understanding is 
factive in the sense that (at least) all the “central” propositions in the set must 
be true, but others (e.g. Elgin 2007, Riggs 2009, Potochnik 2020) reject factivity. 
For current purposes, let us grant that some types of understanding are factive, 
and that the epistemic value of such understanding may well be explainable in 
veritistic terms (Ahlström-Vij 2013, 31–34). This is compatible with there being 
non-factive understanding too, which is fundamentally epistemically valuable 
(alongside e.g. true belief). 
In order to explain the epistemic value of p-justification in terms of non-
factive understanding, practices of p-justification should typically promote 
non-factive understanding. Is that plausible? The idea that philosophy’s epis-
temic success consists in some kind of non-factive understanding is not new 
(see e.g., Graham 2017; Shand 2017, 292; McSweeney forthcoming), although 
it is not always clear just what non-factive understanding is, beyond the very 
rough characterisation above. Here is one reason to be optimistic, however. 
When Beebee (2018) suggests we reconceive of philosophy’s aim, she puts for-
ward a position she calls equilibrism about philosophy, which draws on some 
famous methodological remarks of David Lewis’s. According to equilibrism, 
the aim of philosophical inquiry is to “find out what equilibria there are that 
can withstand examination” (Lewis 1983, x; Beebee 2018, 16). An equilibrium 
is an internally cohesive set of philosophical claims and assumptions, both 
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first-order and methodological (e.g. about how Occam’s razor is to be applied, 
or how important common sense is to preserve). With respect to most philo-
sophically interesting phenomena, there will be more than one equilibrium 
that can withstand examination. 
As we have seen, there is little reason to think that p-justification can ever 
adjudicate between such equilibria positions. But there is quite good reason 
to think that p-justification is an efficient means to the charting of equilibria 
with respect to philosophically interesting questions. Indeed, the co-existence 
of equally well-supported accounts of the same phenomenon is the very pre-
dicament that leads many veritists to despair about the epistemic value of 
p-justification. However, if there is relevant epistemic value in the situation 
of multiple equally well-supported philosophical accounts of the same phe-
nomenon, that is not a problem. Beebee doesn’t discuss what the value of 
equilibria-charting might be, but recall Elgin’s discussion of aesthetics, where 
reason-giving and disagreement co-exist. Elgin argues that the function of 
reason-giving there is to increase (non-factive) understanding: publicly avail-
able and assessable reasons highlight features of the object of inquiry and make 
a case for their importance and relevance. The continuous and irresolvable 
“competition” between multiple accounts contributes to our understanding 
of the object: it is enhanced when we appreciate the force of, and intercon-
nections between, the arguments, reasons, and assumptions that make up a 
perspective or an interpretation. Again, this function is not limited to disputes 
where there is no fact of the matter (Elgin 2017, 181): 
the highlighting of relevant features (…) is why we find advancement in 
understanding in fields like palaeontology where in principle resolvable 
disagreements may never be resolved. We understand more about the 
Neanderthals and about our understanding of them when we appreci-
ate the force of arguments for and against the claim that they buried 
their dead. 
If this is right, then the co-existence of multiple philosophical accounts in 
equilibrium about causation, or moral responsibility, may well be a state of 
non-factive understanding. Insofar as non-factive understanding is fundamen-
tally epistemically valuable, p-justification can derive its epistemic value from 
its ability to promote that type of state. 
I want to briefly mention one other option for the axiological non-uniformist 
here, which takes a somewhat different approach to how epistemic value can 
be transferred. So far, we have thought of derivative epistemic value in instru-
mentalist terms: p-justification has (or fails to have) derivative epistemic value 
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because it is (or fails to be) instrumental to acquiring products with fundamen-
tal epistemic value. Proceduralism about value takes things to be the other way 
around. Products (e.g. epistemic states) may have derivative epistemic value 
in virtue of being the result of a procedure or practice which is (or instanti-
ates properties that are) fundamentally epistemically valuable. As Goldman 
(1999, 75) puts it, a proceduralist epistemology “fasten[s] on the intrinsic 
merits of intellectual practices to judge their epistemic worth or propriety”. A 
proceduralist explanation of the epistemic value of p-justification would hold 
that the philosophical procedures and practices that tend to produce p-justified 
accounts are themselves epistemically valuable. 
According to Helen Longino’s (2002) well-known proceduralist social episte-
mology of science, the epistemic value of scientific inquiry lies in the objectivity 
of the procedures that constitute it. An objective procedure is one that fulfils the 
following four conditions: (1) “publicly recognised forums for the criticism of evi-
dence, methods, and of assumptions and reasoning”; (2) mutual “uptake of criti-
cism” in the sense that criticism must be responded to and taken seriously, but 
critics must also take account of responses; (3) “publicly recognised standards 
by reference to which theories, hypotheses and […] practices are evaluated and 
by appeal to which criticism is made relevant”; (4) a “tempered equality of 
intellectual authority” meant to guard against letting e.g. the social status of 
some epistemic subjects influence assessment of reasons and accounts (2002, 
128–135).11 Something counts as scientific knowledge, on Longino’s picture, 
insofar as it is the product of a procedure characterised by something like 
these contraints. There are no further constraints on the outcome. 
Whether or not this is an attractive picture of the epistemic value of scien-
tific inquiry, there is some promise to understanding the value of philosophical 
inquiry in terms of it. As Peter (2009, 124) notes, 
[w]hat Longino puts at the center of her epistemology is the demand that 
[…] claims be scrutinized from a variety of perspectives, and in particular 
that it is possible to subject the background assumptions embedded in 
scientific practices that support these claims to critical examination of 
their metaphysical, empirical, and normative implications. 
Longino’s procedural objectivity is meant to embody conditions where this is 
the case. I’m not wedded to the idea that the epistemic value of procedures that 
ensure continuous, meticulous scrutiny of any claim or assumption, includ-
ing very basic or entrenched ones, examination of methodological principles, 
11  For another procedural account of objectivity see Elgin 2017, ch. 7.
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and draws out implications of all kinds, needs to be understood in terms of 
objectivity (nor that this is the best way to understand ‘objectivity’). However, 
I think there is some plausibility to the idea that inquiries that realize (1)–(4) 
instantiate something very central to epistemic life, a type of intellectual con-
scientiousness perhaps, that is valuable quite independently of whether it, in 
a given context, tends to lead to some particular epistemic state with inde-
pendent epistemic value (e.g. true belief). Of course, if the epistemic value of 
p-justification is to be explained in terms of the value of objective procedures 
(or whatever we might want to call them), practices of p-justification must 
fulfil the conditions for procedural objectivity.
Here too there are reasons for optimism. First, if we look at the state of 
philosophy, it certainly seems that philosophical inquiry invites the scrutiny 
of any claim, including deeply entrenched background assumptions, from a 
variety of perspectives. As we know, little if anything is ever agreed upon as 
settled once and for all. This is witnessed by the fact that philosophical issues 
are perennial: the same questions and approaches come up, or are questioned, 
again and again, even when we for some time might have thought that we had 
settled the fate of that view or approach once and for all. I think there is a good 
case for thinking that philosophical inquiry, when done well, does go some way 
towards realizing something like (1)–(4). On the other hand, there is certainly a 
lot of room for improvement. For instance, Wilson (2013) argues that bias and 
sociological determinants impede philosophical debate, which would seem to 
violate the fourth criterion of procedural objectivity. 
But even if philosophical inquiry is not always or fully procedurally objec-
tive, the procedural claim that philosophical inquiry is epistemically valuable 
and thereby able to provide genuine p-justification insofar as it is procedur-
ally objective might be a fitting way for us to understand epistemic value here. 
First, we can certainly take measures to improve epistemic activities in philoso-
phy with respect to procedural objectivity, while it is highly unclear how to do 
that with respect to promotion of true belief. Second, philosophical disagree-
ments are similar in nature to other disagreements where proceduralism is 
considered suitable. On Longino’s account, objectivity is a bulwark against par-
tiality, illegitimate exclusion and silencing of certain perspectives, preferences 
or experiences. The procedural account of objectivity is meant to recognise 
the possibility of deep disagreement between participants in an epistemic 
environment, which makes it implausible that all sides can agree on an inde-
pendent condition for the correctness or acceptability of the outcomes of the 
procedure. Hence, it is better to define acceptability in terms of the conditions 
of the procedure. This ability to accommodate deep disagreement (on e.g. val-
ues, or what constitutes the “common good” even when there is agreement on 
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the facts) has made pure proceduralism popular among political philosophers 
defining democratic legitimacy (Peter 2008, 2009). Deep disagreement is a fact 
of philosophy too, as memorably captured in the hypothetical debate between 
Argle and Bargle on whether or not holes are material objects (Lewis and 
Lewis 1970). Argle and Bargle finally recognise that they agree on what the costs 
and benefits of each view are, but disagree on how to weigh those together, 
i.e. on how important the respective costs and benefits are. This, of course, is 
the situation philosophers find themselves in when there are multiple equally 
p-justified accounts of the same phenomenon. 
5.3 Summary: The Epistemology of Philosophically Interesting  
Modal Claims
According to tem, one is justified in making the philosophically interesting 
modal claim p just in case one is justified in accepting a philosophical theory 
that contains or implies p. One is justified in accepting a philosophical theory 
insofar as it is p-justified, that is, has undergone the examination that is the 
bread and butter of academic philosophy as we know it (and this is obviously 
a matter of degree).
This is combined with an epistemic value pluralism, according to which there 
are other fundamental epistemic goods than true belief; and which epistemic 
good an epistemic practice or state is to be evaluated with respect to depends 
on the context of inquiry, because different epistemic goods are salient in dif-
ferent contexts of inquiry. Thus, the optimism about p-justification is under-
pinned by the postulation of a fundamental epistemic good that p-justification 
plausibly promotes and the claim that this epistemic good is plausibly salient 
in the context of philosophical inquiry. In order to fully defend this position, 
either of the approaches sketched in the previous subsection would be inter-
esting to explore. That is, either p-justification is derivatively epistemically 
valuable because it tends to promote non-factive understanding, which, in 
addition to true belief, is fundamentally epistemically valuable. Or the prac-
tices of p-justification are epistemically valuable in themselves because they 
are procedurally objective, and the results of such a process (e.g. a plurality of 
well-supported philosophical theories of the same phenomenon) have deriva-
tive epistemic value.
This is a form of axiological non-uniformism about modal epistemology, 
because it also holds that modal claims outside the class of philosophically 
interesting ones need other types of modal justification. For instance, everyday 
modal claims might call for truth-conducive justification based on relevant 
experiential knowledge, and interesting modal claims in contexts of scientific 
inquiry might call for truth-conducive justification of the theories that imply 
or contain them, in line with Fischer’s original version of tem. This would then 
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be because in everyday and scientific inquiry, believing truly is the salient fun-
damental epistemic good. 
To be clear, I do not pretend to have argued for epistemic value pluralism 
here – just as those who generally assume veritistic monism do not tend to 
provide arguments for their position. I think there are independent arguments 
in light of which pluralism is plausible, although there is no space for them 
here. Neither do I pretend to have argued independently for the claim that 
non-factive understanding, or procedural objectivity, are fundamental epis-
temic goods, although I think both of the discussed candidates are well worth 
exploring in such a role. My main concern was, in any case, with presenting 
a coherent and interesting way to make sense of the non-uniformist position 
according to which philosophically interesting modal claims need to be justi-
fied in a different way than e.g. everyday (and perhaps scientific) modal claims. 
6	 Clarificatory	Remarks
In this final section of substance, I will make some clarificatory remarks that 
I hope will diffuse some potential worries about the account proposed above. 
Since there can often be more than one p-justified theory, two philosophers 
who accept different p-justified theories can be equally justified in making or 
accepting opposing modal claims. As a toy example, a dualist might be jus-
tified in claiming that philosophical zombies are possible, and a physicalist 
might be justified in claiming that philosophical zombies are not possible. I do 
not think there is anything odd about this consequence in itself. In fact, similar 
scenarios can occur even when justification for p must indicate the truth of p, 
as long as we allow the very plausible assumption that p’s being justified does 
not guarantee that p is true. None of this implies that philosophically interest-
ing modal claims are not truth-apt, or that their truth is relative in some con-
troversial sense – it is perfectly compatible with there being an objective fact 
of the matter as to which claim or theory is true.
However, we might have to re-think some of our practices where we rely on 
modal claims in philosophical argumentation, or at least of what such argu-
ments can accomplish. For instance, Chalmers (1996) intends the claim that 
zombies are possible to be an independent reason to think that physicalism 
is false. But if the only support for that claim comes from its being part of or 
implied by a theory one accepts, e.g. dualism, it will hardly have traction with 
someone who rejects dualism in favour of physicalism. This will certainly be 
less than what some have hoped for. One objection might be that the reason 
claims like the one about zombies are philosophically interesting is that they 
can play this role of independently justified premises in modal arguments, 
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i.e. that they are not interesting “in themselves”. An epistemology of philo-
sophically interesting modal claims like the current one thus undermines the 
interestingness. It might be true of some possibility claims (about e.g. zombies, 
or utility monsters) that they are philosophically interesting only insofar as 
they can help us decide whether we should be utilitarians or physicalists about 
mind. But many modal claims are philosophically interesting in themselves 
(e.g. timeless world, different laws of nature). Moreover, let me stress that the 
idea of philosophical arguments as ultimately meant to convince one’s oppo-
nent and/or an impartial audience that one’s theory is true is in need of revision 
anyway, given the proposed reconception of epistemic value sketched above. 
That the same is true for arguments with modal premises is thus unsurprising.
Another worry is that there is really no difference between partial modal 
scepticism and the epistemology of philosophically interesting modal claims 
offered here. On both views, we lack truth-conducive reasons to believe one 
way or the other with respect to philosophically interesting modal matters. 
However, I have argued for a number of other claims about our epistemic situ-
ation. In particular I have suggested that we can have epistemic support for mak-
ing claims about philosophically interesting modal matters, and I have detailed 
how that might work. It is true that all of this is compatible with what the 
sceptic says. But the suggested view isn’t scepticism, because it proceeds from 
an assumption of epistemic value pluralism: p-justification is a form of epis-
temic support because it promotes a fundamental epistemic good, although 
a distinct one from true belief. Of course, pluralism may be rejected – I have 
not had the space to argue systematically for it here. Veritists too often assume 
rather than argue for their view. Of course, assuming veritism, my account 
would be a form of scepticism. But even then the above is an improvement 
on the “bare” partial sceptical thesis prominent in the present literature, in the 
sense that it offers an analysis of philosophical practice and its value (even if, 
given veritism, this value wouldn’t be epistemic).
Finally, I anticipate that it will be objected that many philosophers do not 
recognize themselves in this picture: they aim to find the truth, and they intend 
philosophical methodology to be truth-conducive, and in fact they think it 
often is. Let me stress a couple of points that will make this insistence less wor-
rying for my proposal. 
To begin, it is not part of the current proposal – whether filled out in terms 
of proceduralism or non-factive understanding – that anything goes and philo-
sophical inquiry is completely free-floating of known facts about the world. 
There is a whole lot of things known about the world that one needs to take 
into account in the process of p-justification, just as there are facts about 
Le Compotier that serious interpreters must take into account.
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Next, the view does not require that philosophical methods are not in fact 
truth-conducive with respect to philosophically interesting truths. Maybe some 
of them sometimes are. The problem is that we cannot tell, and therefore this 
is not a very useful standard for evaluating epistemic practices in philosophy. 
So while we certainly can evaluate philosophically interesting modal claims, 
or philosophical theories, for whether they promote true belief – indeed this 
is what partial modal sceptics, or sceptics about philosophy, have done – this 
perspective is unduly limiting if epistemic value pluralism is viable. From a 
veritist perspective, we cannot say why our methods seem valuable, why they 
seem to provide support, why we keep doing what we are doing despite being 
aware of all the shortcomings, and most importantly it is hard to see how we 
could improve. That is the main point of the proposal: there are other epis-
temic goods in relation to which we are in a much better position to evaluate – 
and also improve – philosophical practices, and there is a good case to be made 
for them being salient in the context of philosophical inquiry. Moreover, it is 
not my view that some contexts of inquiry are essentially and forever governed 
by one fundamental epistemic good, and that everyone who engages in the 
relevant inquiry immediately picks up on and accepts it. It is therefore natural 
that there is disagreement over this, and the current piece is a petition in such 
a debate.
Relatedly, I think there is a useful distinction to be made between the indi-
vidual philosopher’s beliefs and personal aims – which may involve settling 
on a true belief – and the epistemic states, aims, and values of philosophy 
as a discipline, where I have focused on the latter (see also Nado 2017, 12–13; 
Beebee 2018, 11). Although epistemology has often focused on beliefs, other 
states too can be epistemically evaluated. Nevertheless, one might worry that 
if the epistemic support afforded by p-justification is not primarily understood 
as providing reason to think that a theory or claim is true, it might seem irra-
tional for one to believe on the basis of p-justification (whether or not that 
is one’s aim). So what individual attitude does it licence? One option is to go 
with a watered-down belief substitute that requires a lesser degree of e.g. con-
fidence, as has been suggested in the literature on philosophical disagreement 
(Goldberg 2013, Barnett 2019), but since that route is tied to the veritist assump-
tion rejected above, I consider it more promising to think of it in terms of what 
van Fraasen calls acceptance in the context of scientific theories (see also Elgin 
2017, Beebee 2018, Rosen 2020). Acceptance is voluntary, and involves taking 
on certain commitments – for instance to employ certain claims as premises 
in reasoning, to confront new relevant phenomena using the resources of 
that theory, to answer questions about and defend it in the face of criticism, 
and assume “the role of the explainer” (Van Fraassen 1980, 13).
Downloaded from Brill.com10/18/2021 08:20:55AM
via University of Gothenburg
24 Ylwa Sjölin Wirling
10.1163/18756735-00000146 | GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN  (2021) 1–28
7 Conclusion
I have offered a way to fill out the non-uniformist idea that philosophically inter-
esting modal claims need to be justified in a different way from e.g. everyday 
modal claims. I cashed this out as an axiologically motivated non-uniformism, 
according to which different modal claims need to be justified differently 
because they occur in different contexts of inquiry governed by different fun-
damental epistemic goods. This is underwritten by an assumption of epistemic 
value pluralism, i.e. the view that there is a plurality of fundamental epistemic 
goods. In particular, philosophically interesting modal claims primarily occur 
in the course of philosophical inquiry, which is – unlike e.g. everyday inquiry – 
governed by a fundamental epistemic good distinct from that of believing truly. 
In line with Fischer’s (2017) tem, I proposed that one is justified in making 
or accepting a philosophically interesting modal claim c when c is part of or 
implied by a justified philosophical theory that one accepts. However, unlike 
Fischer, I suggested that philosophical theories often are – or at least can 
be – justified in the sense relevant to philosophy, and that this sense is best 
understood in terms of either promotion of non-factive understanding or as 
resulting from a procedurally objective inquiry.
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